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The late Lon Fuller was undoubtedly one of the most original,
interesting, and profound legal thinkers of the present century. Genera-
tions of contract students have been taught through his casebook, one
of the finest examples of the art, and his famous article (co-authored
-with his student, William R. Perdue, Jr.) The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract Damages,' has probably been the most influential single article in
the whole history of modem contract scholarship. But the bulk of
Fuller's writings are of a more jurisprudential character, and it is per-
haps unfortunate that he is probably best known to students of juris-
prudence today through his article responding to H.L.A. Hart's classic
Holmes lecture, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals."2
I say this is unfortunate because, even though some may feel that
Fuller had the better of this debate, that article does not reveal Fuller at
this best, nor does it provide an overall framework or theory within
which the Hart-Fuller debate can be seen in context.
This was partly Fuller's own fault. Although he wrote widely on
legal theory, he was not a systematic thinker, or at least he failed to put
together his scattered thoughts into any systematic framework. Some
sympathetic interpretation and even reconstruction of his work is
needed to view it in the round, and this posthumously published selec-
tion of his writings will surely serve as a major catalyst to that end.3
• Professor of English Law, St. John's College, Oxford; visiting Professor, Harvard Law
School, 1982-1983. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version of this review by Richard
Fallon, Charles Fried, Frank Michelman and Robert S. Summers.
1. Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 373
(1936).
2. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958).
Fuller's response is in the same volume. FullerPositivijm andFidelity to Lan--A Repy to Profes-
sor Hart, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 630 (1958).
3. Professor Robert S. Summers' forthcoming book on Fuller in the new series on jurists
entitled PRoFILES iN LEGAL THEoRy offers just this needed reconstruction of Fuller's legal theory.
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Although the essays taken individually still fail to reveal the systematic
theory that Fuller spent much of his life attempting to develop, they do
enable the reader who-sees them as a whole to have a far better under-
standing of the general nature of Fuller's approach to law. The editor's
introduction is particularly helpful in this regard 4 especially the pages
on The Ideal of Legal Processess and the table on page thirty-four that
sets out some of the distinctive characteristics of different methods of
social order as Fuller perceived them.
I
The essays are collected into three parts. The first part contains
only one piece-a previously unpublished essay entitled Means and
Ends that Fuller apparently intended to use as an introductory chapter
to a book on the principles of social order. The book was never writ-
ten, though his article on The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, later
published--also posthumously-in the Harvard Law Review, 6 seems to
have been an outgrowth of it and may well have been envisioned by
Fuller as a possible chapter of this never-to-be-completed work.
The other two parts contain a variety of pieces, some previously
unpublished, that the editor skillfully brings together to justify the title,
The Princioles of Social Order, which Fuller had in mind for his own
book. Part H, The Principles and Forms of Social Order, comprises
seven essays--all previously published-which contain the fullest ac-
count of Fuller's ideas on different methods or principles of social or-'
dering. At various times and in various places he lists these methods or
principles; the lists and even the numbers are not always the same, but
he deals with several central concerns at length in these essays. Adjudi-
cation is clearly one method of social ordering; this is the topic of the
Harvard Law Review article, already referred to, republished here in
somewhat abbreviated form.? Other core methods are contract, dis-
cussed here in some pages taken from the third edition of his
casebook;8 legislation, addressed here in an excerpt from The Anatomy
of Law;9 mediation, which has received little attention from jurists but
benefits from Fuller's experiences as a labor arbitrator, 10 managerial
4. L. FuLLER, PRuNcIPLES oF SocIAL ORDR, Introduction (IL Winston, ed. 1981).
5. Id at 26-29.
6. 92 Hnv. L. REv. 353 (1978). Although the article was published in full only after
Fuller's death, parts of it had appeared in Fuller, Adudication andthe Rule of Law, 54 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PRoc. (1960) and in Fuller, Collective.BargainingandtheArhitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3.
7. L. FULLER, smpra note 4, at 86; see supra note 6.
8. Id at 169.
9. Id at 158.
10. I1d at 125.
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direction, somewhat curiously treated in a paper on Irrigation and Tyr-
anny;II and custom, presented here in one of Fuller's finest papers enti-
tled Human Interaction and the Law, which is also concerned with
contract and enacted law.12
Part III contains four pieces of less general interest, only some
parts of which have been previously published. They con cern the roles
of legal education,13 the lawyer,14 the scholar,15 and the legal philoso-
pher.16 Although these papers are less relevant to his overall theme,
they nevertheless reveal the depth of some of Fuller's chief concerns.
In particular, they show that the emphasis on means as opposed to
ends-in any event, never wholly separable in Fuller's view-is closely
related to Fuller's vision of the role of the lawyer in society, and also,
therefore, to his vision of the role of legal education. One of the main
tasks of the lawyer is to study the different means of social ordering so
that he can advise on the selection of the most appropriate means to
achieve a predetermined end. But, if he is to do this task properly he
will sometimes have to understand and convince others why the inher-
ent limits on the use of one or another of the principles of sound order
may themselves shape the ends to be sought. So the lawyer must un-
derstand the principles of social order and the relationship of means
and ends; legal education must, therefore, see that lawyers are properly
instructed in these matters.
An appendix to the book contains a fascinating letter, apparently
written in the early 1940's, from Fuller to his Harvard colleague
Thomas Reed Powell. In the letter Fuller responds to criticisms made
by Powell and by reviewers of his book, The Law in Quest ofltsef, and
bares much of his basic political ideology. He reveals his sympathy
with Burke's philosophy, "which conceives society to be founded on
institutions and conventions which are not wholly rational and which
conceives of progress as a gradual improvement of those institutions
and conventions in the direction of greater rationality,"1 7 his prefer-
11. Id at 188. This was a review of a book by Karl A. Wittfogel entitled OmENTAL DESPOT-
iM-A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957), which dealt with the apparently unprom-
ising subject of the relationships of political power in societies heavily dependent on artificial
irrigation. Fuller further developed the "managerial" form of legal ordering in some powerful
pages in his "Reply to Critics" in the Appendix to the revised edition of THE MORALITY OF LAW
207-16 (1969).
12. L. FULLER, supra note 4, at 211.
13. Id at 249.
14. Id at 264.
15. Id at 271.
16. Id at 282.
17. Id at 297-98.
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ence-within limits--for judge-made law over enacted legislation, 18 his
belief in using the "autonomous ordering of private individuals" to ac-
complish as much reform as possible,'9 and his advocacy of the com-
parative law/natural law methodology in common law development.20
Fuller's jurisprudential writing has already received much com-
ment and criticism, and doubtless more will follow the publication of
these essays and the publication of Professor Robert S. Summers' forth-
coming reevaluation. Fuller's writings on contract have also been
enormously influential on modem contract scholarship, but the rela-
tionship between Fuller's work on legal theory as a whole and his work
on contract (theoretical though much of that was) has been largely ne-
glected. I shall therefore devote the remainder of this review to a study
of the relationship between Fuller's ideas across these two fields.
II
Just as he never expounded a systematic legal theory, Fuller never
articulated a comprehensive theory of contractual obligation. His two
principal contributions to contract scholarship are the reliance article,2'
which provided the framework for his casebook, and Consideration and
Form, published in the Columbia Law Review in 1941. 22 In the third
(1972) edition of the casebook, however, he included a section on The
Role of Contract, reprinted in the present work,23 in which he touches
briefly on his "principles of social ordering" and explains the relation-
ship between one of these principles--contract-and the others. This
discussion suggests that Fuller may well have regarded contract as the
predominant principle because it seems to be involved one way or an-
other with all the others.
In The Role of Contract Fuller expands his list of the "principles of
social ordering"; it is the last and longest of these lists that he produced.
The principles are, in his own words:
18. Id at 302-03.
19. Id at 299.
20. It is fascinating to note that Fuller here says that he sees his two great articles on contract
law as closer in their methodology to Pothier than to Llewellyn, Cook, Williston, or LangdelL Id
at 296-97.
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLuM. L. REv. 799 (1941). Human Interaction and
the Law in L. FuLLER, supra note 4, at 211, also has claims to be regarded as a major contribution
to contract scholarship.
23. L. FuLLE AND M. EISENBERO, BAsic CONTRACT LAw (3d ed. 1972). The section ap-
pears in L. FuLLER, supra note 4, at 170-87.
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1. The coordination of expectations and actions that arise tacitly
out of interaction, illustrated in "customary law" and "standard
practice."
2. Contract.
3. Property.
4. Officially declared law.
5. Adjudication.
6. Managerial direction.
7. Voting.
8. Mediation.
9. Deliberate resort to chance; "tossing for it."24
Disclaiming any pretense of exhaustiveness, Fuller -proceeds to show
how the various principles may be interrelated and combined. He sug-
gests that the principles fall into two broad categories, those which op-
erate "vertically"-e.g., legislation and managerial direction-and
those which operate "horizontally"--custom, contract, etc. He then
criticizes what he takes to be the modem tendency to see all social or-
dering as "imposed from above" 25 and proceeds to explain how con-
tract relates to his other principles.
Starting with custom, Fuller suggests that the real difficulty is not
discerning the relationship between custom and contract but, indeed, in
drawing any clear distinction between the two.26 Custom consists of
"reciprocal expectations that arise out of human interaction," but that
is true of contract as well. In addition, he lists other, more obvious
affinities between custom and contract; for example, that standard be-
havior of the parties, a sort of personalized custom, may be used to
interpret contract, and that contracts can be implied from conduct.
27
Affinities between property and contract are even more obvious. 28
Indeed, in an unpublished manuscript cited by the editor, Fuller de-
clares that "the institution of private property is, in fact, only the static
and relatively less important side of the institution of private
contract.
' 2 9
Adjudication, too, has its affinities with or even its origin in con-
tract because, at least in some societies, it grew out of a voluntary sys-
tem of settling "blood feuds" by arbitration. Furthermore, modem
arbitration is a simple adjudicative process founded on contract.30
24. L. FuLLER, supra note 4, at 170-71.
25. Id at 174-75.
26. Id at 175-76.
27. Id at 176.
28. Id at 177-78.'
29. Id at 27. In fact this suggestion bristles with difficulties if only because private property
in the broadest sense--and hence some distribution of entitlements-is a necessary prerequisite to
all contract.
30. Id at 178.
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It may appear more difficult to see any affinity between manage-
rial direction and contract, but most managerial power comes from vol-
untary employment relationships. 31  Even enacted law and
governmental managerial ordering are not devoid of contractual un-
derpinnings. Here and in many other places32 Fuller argues that en-
acted law involves a tacit promise by the lawgiver that citizens will be
treated in accordance with the laws thus enacted. Fuller might well
have added two illustrations--one from the managerial field and one
from the legislative field--to strengthen his argument. He might have
referred to the relationship between lord and serf in feudal society,
which was highly "managerial" in Fuller's sense, yet frequently re-
quired the swearing of an oath of fealty to inaugurate the relationship,,
a clear use of "contractuar' ordering. Fuller might also have pointed to
any of a number of instances in which the public demands that vague
enactments be replaced by more precise ones. Such a demand clearly
presupposes some sort of obligation on the legislator's part to abide by
the wording of the legislation. Whether Fuller correctly viewed this
kind of obligation as contractual is a question I shall address later.33Fuller has some difficulty seeing how contract can be related to
voting. He attempts to analogize voting to a consensual, multilateral
contract that lacks the element of a "trade-off, '34 but this illustration is
somewhat forced and unconvincing. Curiously, he fails to notice a
much better argument sometimes made by political philosophers, 35 an
argument one might think would have appealed to him, despite its
many rivals: namely, that participation in voting involves a tacit agree-,
ment by the losers to abide the result of the vote. The same argument
can be used, and indeed historically was used by Chief Justice Holt,36
to justify the rule that a person who voluntarily submits a dispute to
arbitration is bound by the result and impliedly undertakes to carry out
the arbitrator's award.
31. Id.
32. See id at 167, 172. 234-35; L. FuLLER, supra note 11, at 39, 209-19. The arguments set
forth at pages 209-19 are especially powerful
33. See infra text between notes 67 & 68.
34. L. FuLLER, smpra note 4, at 179. Fuller writes:
Suppose that at the outset of a law suit the judge proposes to counsel an expedient that
will speed the trial .... [l]f either objects, he will follow the book, if both consent the
short cut will be adopted.... This phenomenon is worthy of mention because we tend
to identify contract with the notion of a trade or exchange, and it is well to remember
that there are consensual arrangements from which the element of "trade-olf" is absent.
35. See, ag., P. SiNoM, DEmocRAcy AND DisoBnm31CE (1973). Interestingly, Singer actu-
ally invokes the analogy of the legal concept of estoppel on which to base this implicit promise.
See id at 51-52.
36. Squire v. Grevell, 87 Eng. Rep. 797, 6 Mod. 34 (1703); Purslow v. Bailey, 92 Eng. Rep.
190, 2 Ld. Raym. 1039 (1705).
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Finally, mediation and lotteries can be and often are underpinned
by contract; indeed, the former can hardly work without contract or at
least some significant element of consent.
After this analysis the reader can hardly remain in doubt about
Fuller's view of the relative importance of contract as a method of so-
cial ordering. Although he never specifically asserts that it is the "most
important" method--and indeed, he would probably have resisted the
question as oversimplistic, absent clear criteria of importance-it cer-
tainly must rank among the more dominant.
Any doubts as to the primacy of contract are stilled by Fuller's
repeated emphasis, in other contexts, on the essential purposiveness of
all law. This point is closely linked to his views on the value-laden
nature of law, for purposiveness presupposes an idea or vision of what
law ought to be. Throughout his writings Fuller reiterates the purpo-
sive nature of law and the rationality of the whole enterprise and,
therefore, of all methods of ordering.37 Much of his writing on the "in-
ner morality" of law, for example, assumes that law is purposive. It is
only this-he says-which justifies finding a "tacit promise" by the leg-
islator or government to judge the citizen's conduct in accordance with
enacted law; otherwise, he rightly finds no conceptual necessity to bind
the legislator or the government's hands.38 A legislator whose purpose
is to reduce his subjects to a state of neurotic despair could enact a law
one day and order his subjects to be punished for complying with it the
next; there is nothing contrary to logic in such an exercise in tyranny
unless one first makes some basic assumptions about the purposes of
legislation, and perhaps of law in general.
Fuller's suggestion that the primary purpose even of adjudication
is to assist in the future ordering of affairs by parties, or at least by the
particular litigants, 39 also illustrates his stress on purposiveness.
Doubts must surely begin to creep in here as to whether Fuller's ideo-
logical liberalism distorted his evaluation of the nature of adjudication.
For even those who would wholeheartedly agree that adjudication is a
rational, and, in that sense, a purposive exercise, might pause before
agreeing that "adjudication should be viewed as a form of social order-
ing, as a way in which the relations of men to one another are governed
and regulated." 40 This goes too far. Adjudication may take place even
where precedent cannot control or be established; indeed, some adjudi-
cations, such as arbitration, may be private in nature. Adjudication
37. L. FuLLEm supra note 4, at 17-18 (editor's introduction).
38. Id at 216-19.
39. Id at 90.
40. Id
DUKE LAW JOU[.AL
may arise largely or entirely from the need to sort out a prior dispute
without future implications, and the adjudication may even be settled
on the grounds of "rightness" rather than for "goal" oriented reasons;
that is, the adjudication may have no consequentialist aims or results. 4'
Similar criticisms could be made of Fuller's views of the proper
role and limits of legislation. There is no doubt that he saw the role of
legislation and its administration as essentially a mode of facilitating,
"human interaction." Indeed, Fuller took some pains to explain why
even the criminal law should be seen in this way despite the obvious
difficulties with "victimless crimes." 42 Curiously, Fuller actually ad-
dresses the relatively rare case ofjustifiable retroactive legislation-val,
idating bona fide marriages when necessary forms have been destroyed
by a fire43-apparently without worrying that in such a case the legisli-
tor is trying to sort out an existing or past problem and not to regulate
human behavior in the future. Perhaps he took for granted that this
was a supplemental or parasitic use of legislation, but it is odd that he
did not make this explicit.44
Turning to Fuller's treatment of contract itself, it becomes per-
fectly clear that here too he sees contract as a principle of social order-
ing in the sense that it is a way of regulatingfuture human interaction.
There is no hint here of any possible secondary function such as that. of
"clearing up a mess," sorting out the results of accidental and unin-
tended interaction. Furthermore, it is an essential part of Fuller's per-
ception that contract is an autonomous way of regulating future
conduct. Parties regulate their own future conduct through contract;
the regulation is not imposed on them. Fuller articulates this most
clearly in Consideration and Form,45 in which he seeks to extricate the
principle of private autonomy from some of the excesses of will theory.
Thus he rejects the notion that private autonomy is somehow inconsis-
tent with the "objective" interpretation of contracts,46 although he does
not fully develop this argument either here or elsewhere.
41. For the difference between "rightness" reasons and "goal" reasons, see Summers, lwo
T7)per ofSubstantveReasons The Core of a Theory of Common.Law Just~fcation, 63 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 707 (1978).
42. L. FULLER, supra note 4, at 231-33.
43. Id at 162-63.
44. The same point was made by Marshall Cohen in a symposium on Fullers book, THE
MORALrTY OF LAW: Cohen, Law, Morality and Purpose, 10 ViL. L REv. 640, 652 (1965). Fuller
attempted an answer in the revised edition of THE MoRALnTY oF LAW, see L. FULLER, supra note
11, at 239-40, but the answer seems lame; he relies simply on "the special social context."
45. Fuller, =yra note 22, at 806-10.
46. Id at 807-08.
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So firmly did Fuller base contract on the role of private autonomy
that he seems to have been quite shocked by Llewellyn's suggestion
that if aggrieved contracting parties did not sufficiently pursue civil
remedies for breach, "the state might find itself compelled to intervene
to strengthen the regime of contract." 47 To Fuller this was "startling."
"To enforce a contract for a party who is willing to leave it unenforced
is just as absurd as making the contract for him in the first place."48
Fuller hastened to add that he realized that there were some contracts
required by law but insisted that this was "a derivative phenomenon."
I am not so sure we can sweep away compulsory exchanges imposed by
the state in this way,49 but more important, it is increasingly apparent
that consumers often lack the capacity, money, or adequate incentives
to enforce contractual duties against those who systematically abuse the
law. Is there anything absurd about the state lending its aid to assist or'
even taking the initiative in eniforcing such contracts with a view to
suppressing or deterring this sort of conduct? After all, fraud has long
been a criminal offense.
Fuller recognizes elsewhere50 that the measure of damages for
breach of contract is not a purely logical corollary of the duty breached,
and that expectation damages may be awarded partly as a "prophy-
laxis" to deter contract breakers. This powerful and original insight
seems somewhat at odds with his rejection of state aid to the enforce-
ment of contracts; measuring damages by their deterrent effect de-
mands that *we recognize the award of expectation damages as a policy
decision made by the courts as organs of the state. Of course, it might
be said that in such cases the courts only assist in the enforcement of
private rights at the behest of the parties and that Fuller's real objection
was to a more active state role in the general maintenance of the con-
tract regime. But, if this is the point of his objection, it reflects a some-
what outdated liberal belief that those who need assistance are able to
identify their own problems and know where to go for help. Few peo-
ple with experience of the problems of the poor and disadvantaged to-
day believe this to be true.
III
The above criticisms of Fuller's overall theory of contractual obli-
gation may seem matters of detail. But perhaps because he never sys-
47. L. FuLLER, supra note 4, at 105 (quoting K. LLEWELLYN AND E. HoEBEL, THE CHEY-
ENNE WAY 48 (1941)).
48. Id
49. See P. ATYA, THE RisE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 742-54 (1979).
50. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 1, at 61.
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tematically combined many of the different insights that underlie his
thoughts, his position also contains deeper weaknesses and ambiva-
lences. These difficulties with Fuller's theory can be classified into
three groups.
A. Contract and Exchange.
When Fuller writes in general terms about the role of contract,
and about the relationship of contract to other forms of social ordering,
he is, I think, insufficiently clear about the distinction between contract
and exchange; he also fails to disentangle adequately the separate ele-
ments in contract. Contract differs from mere exchange because it con-
tains an element of futurity-what Ian Macneil calls "presentiation." 51
Contracts bind people to future performances. Exchange can be a
purely present transaction. The fact that contracts are often defined as
consisting of an "exchange of promises" must not obscure the fact that
such an exchange necessarily looks to future performance, while many
cash transactions involve nothing beyond a present simultaneous ex-
change-for example, a cash purchase in a supermarket. Of course, in
modem law the extensive use of devices such as "implied warranties"
means that even a simultaneous exchange of goods for cash has an ele-
ment of futurity in it; but this is not inherent in the exchange itself.
Exchange without warranties is perfectly possible, and indeed such an
exchange was regarded as the norm in early nineteenth century law.
The difference between exchange and contract is quite an elemen-
tary distinction, but it is surprising how often it is overlooked. When
Fuller rejects Bentham's insistence that contract derives its form and
validity from society and law,52 and asserts that the institution of con-
tract "functioned in some measure" before state laws "existed or were
even conceived of,"53 he seems to overlook this simple point. It is al-
most certain that exchange in some form antedates state and law, and
certainly vows and oaths were known in primitive societies. But almost
all historians concede the emergence of executory contracts to be a rel-
atively modem phenomenon.5"
Again, when Fuller argues that contract underpins nearly all the
51. Macneil, Restatement (Second) ofContracts andPrerentiations, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974);
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974).
52. J. BENwHA, WoRcs 309, 333 (J. Bowring e. 1859).
53. L. FULLER, supra note 4, at 174.
54. See, ag., H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (1861); A. SIPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw OF CONTRACT (1975). For anthropological evidence, see M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN
BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 181 (1965); M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONo THE BA-
ROTSE 28, 30, 200, 440-42 (2d ed. 1967).
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other methods of social ordering that he identifies, 55 he does not disen-
tangle the various underlying bases of contractual obligation which he
recognizes and discusses elsewhere, especially in Consideration and
Form 56 Thus it is not always clear in Principles of Social Order
whether he is discussing autonomy and consent, or expectations, or re-
liance, or unjust enrichment, or some unspecified mix of these factors
when he finds contractual elements in various other forms of social or-
dering. For instance, the "tacit promise" which he regards the legisla-
tor as making to his subjects may indeed be some kind of moral or
political obligation, but calling it a promise does not adequately ex-
plain how it can be identified with express promises where the obliga-
tion has, at least traditionally, been seen as deriving from some element
of autonomy or even from the will of the promisor.
.B. The Facilitative and the Remedial Functions of Contract Law.
Like many, indeed nearly all, liberal legal theorists, Fuller saw
contract exclusively in terms of its facilitative function. He saw con-
tract as an institution which enables people to plan their future rela-
tionships. Despite the importance Fuller attached to "remedies ' in the
traditional narrow contractual sense, his writing demonstrates little rec-
'ognition that contract might have a secondary or "remedial" role to
play in a broader and perhaps more significant sense of the concept of
"remedy." In this broader sense "remedial" refers to the function a
court exercises when it imposes on the parties a solution to a problem
that goes beyond the natural or logical implications of the parties' own
ordering. In the traditional and narrower sense, "remedies" for breach
of contract were thought to involve no interventionist action by the
courts; a remedy by way of damages was merely the logical corollary of
wrongful breach. In this broader sense of "remedial," a court does not
merely assist the parties to give effect to the inherent implications of
their own arrangement When it provides a "remedy." It intervenes to
deal with a situation in the nature of an accident, much in the way that
'tort law deals with accidents.
Although Fuller's own work on "remedies" in the narrower sense
demonstrates that damage awards depend on judicial policy choices
rather than on the parties' own intentions, he never seems to have ap-
preciated the full implications of this for the role of contract law more
generally. Some modern scholars, by contrast, see one of the main
functions of contract law as being to help to sort out the unintended
55. L FuLLER, supra note 4, at 175-80.
56. Fuller, spra note 22, at 806-13.
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and perhaps unforeseen results of past voluntary human interaction. 57
Of course, what is "foreseeable" and the specificity with which it is
foreseen are matters of degree, and contracting parties can and often do
try to take account of the unexpected and unintended in their private
orderings. But contracts simply do not contain provisions designed to
deal with everything that occurs. In these circumstances, the private
ordering would break down if it were not supplemented by the reme-
dial role of the law in this broad sense: for example, where perform-
ance of a contract becomes impossible, where unforeseen difficulties
arise, where fundamental changes occur in the background to some
long-term contractual relationship, and so on. But it may also happen
that the law can be used to sort out difficulties in a relationship never
originally thought of as one of a legal-contractual character. Cohabi-
tants who buy a house and then part, for instance, often leave the law"
with the problem of deciding how the property is to be dealt with; other
"family arrangements" which the courts would never enforce while ex-
ecutory may simply cry out for some solution when property has been
transferred without formal contractual arrangements and family dis-
putes then occur.
These are just a few samples of the many cases that courts today
decide under a variety of doctrinal headings-"implied contract,"
"constructive trust," "estoppel," and so on. Most of these cases can be
dealt with as cases of contract if courts are sufficiently enterprising or
counsel sufficiently ingenious in their pleadings; but they are plainly
not examples of the sort of contracts that Fuller discusses in these es-
says as methods of social ordering. In these cases, the courts come in to
clear up a mess after things have gone badly wrong in a relationship,
not simply to enforce compliance with privately made arrangements.
No doubt what the courts do in these cases may help others to
order their affairs better in the future, but it is typical of many of these
cases-the cohabitant and many family cases, for example--that ini-
ialy the parties have such trust in each other that they would never
feel the need to spell out the legal implications of their relationships.
Indeed, as Fuller recognized elsewhere, 58 to try to invoke formal con-
tract in such cases often destroys the very trust on which the relation-
ship is based.
Fuller does not seem to have been greatly interested in, if he recog-
nized at all, this broader remedial role of contract law. He demon-
strates basic hostility to an active judicial role when courts attempt "to
57. L FuLLER, s=pra note 4, at 181.
58. Id at 121.
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write contracts" as opposed to "lay[ing] down rules about contracting."
Furthermore, his view of the proper limits of legislation tends to be of
the traditionally narrow liberal variety: legislation should lay down a
framework within which individuals can exercise their private
autonomy.5 9
All this seems to be extraordinarily narrow and restrictive. Why
shouldn't the law provide assistance to parties to help them sort out
their problems, especially when they have an ongoing relationship the
continuance of which is important to the public? Many countries, for
instance, provide labor mediators or arbitrators to help employers and
unions resolve their differences when industrial disruption threatens.
There are passages in The Forms and Limits of Adjudication6 from
which it might be.inferred that Fuller would not have been happy with
even so modest an element of state initiative. It is even more necessaryr
for the law to step in to help clear up a mess when nofmal relationships
finally break down. Of course this is often done under a different legal
heading-bankruptcy, for instance, or corporate liquidation. One can
hardly suppose Fuller would have objected to state legal activity of this
kind. Perhaps, therefore, Fuller would merely have found the use of
the term "contract" objectionable in this context.
It may appear ironic, in light of his emphasis on "remedies" in the
narrow sense in the reliance article, as well as in the opening chapter of
his casebook, but it almost' seems 'that Fuller would have preferred to
define "remedial contract law" as not part of the law of contract. Al-
though this could be seen as a merely verbal issue, there are real dan-
gers in imposing artificial definitional limits to a subject as important
and central as contract law.' I have suggested elsewhere61 that this kind
of definitional jugglery had serious consequences in the late nineteenth
century when judges persuaded themselves that "pure" freedom of con-
tract remained the fundamental ideal of the law by defining out of con-
tract law any laws which interfered with freedom of contract. This led
'to an impoverished understanding of what was really happening to the
law in the early part of this century, and in some quarters, that danger
still seems to be apparent.
59. Id at 161-63. It is put even more strongly by the editor on page 158: "In Fuller's view,
the only permissible form of legislation is the sort that lets individuals plan their own lives."
However, Professor Summers tells me that he has seen a letter in the Fuller archives in the
-Harvard Law School library, dated May 10, 1965, addressed to Professor Bedau of Tufts-Univer-
sity, in which Fuller expressed support for legislation establishing public transportation systems.
60. L. FuLLn, supra note 4, at 104-05.
61. P. ArnYAH, .pra note 49, at 405.
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C. The Relationship of Reliance to the Principle ofAutonomy.
One of the deepest and strangest ambivalences in Fuller's theory
of contract arises from the relationship between reliance and the princi-
ple of autonomy. Fuller's great article on reliance was, of course, the
starting point for much modem reliance theory.62 It opened up for dis-
cussion the whole relationship between the doctrine of consideration
and the different types of damages awardable in contract. It was, I
think, the first systematic demonstration of the relationship between
promise, benefit, and detrimental reliance on the one side and expecta-
tion damages, restitution "damages," and reliance damages on the
other. But it also challenged the centuries-old orthodoxy which as-
serted that contracts are enforced on the basis of principles of auton-
omy alone-or out of respect for the human will. For the first time
since the seventeenth century natural lawyers it was now seriously con-
tended that contractual obligation could be seen as based primarily on
actual or probable reliance by the promisee.
What is so very curious is that Fuller never seems to have seen in
his recognition of the importance of reliance any challenge to his re-
spect for the priority of the principle of autonomy. In Consideration
andForm he actually refers to a number of cases in which "a promisee
has seriously, and according to ordinary standards of conduct, justifia-
bly relied on a promise which the promisor expressly stipulated should
impose no legal liability on him. ' 63 In a footnote Fuller adds that in
these cases "the principle of reimbursing reliance is regarded as over-
riding the principle of private autonomy."' ' It is astonishing that
Fuller should have left this point without further comment; the impli-
cations cry out for exploration. How can the reliance be just fable
when the "promisor" disclaims responsibility for the consequences-
unless, that is, one accepts that it is the court rather than the parties
which has the responsibility for deciding when reliance is justifiable,
and, therefore, worthy of legal protection. Certainly, as Fuller does
recognize, the result involves a reversal of the normal order of priority
between reliance and autonomy as the controlling principle. But once
this order is reversed in these cases we surely need a principle to tell us
when and why it will be reversed in other cases. Indeed, perhaps we
62. It was preceded by some of Corbin's work and especially section 90 of the first Restate-
ment of Contracts for which Corbin was largely responsible; but at this date reliance theory was
almost exclusively directed to recognition of unbargained-for reliance as an alternative to conven-
tional consideration.
63. Fuller, .spra note 22, at 811.
64. Id at n.16.
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need a principle to explain why autonomy normally takes priority over
reliance rather than the other way around.
Perhaps more fundamental still is the question whether reliance
doctrine is tied to contract law-rather than illustrating a much
broader principle of social policy-in the way Fuller apparently as-
sumed. Once again it is odd that Fuller never addressed this question,
though he came tantalizingly close to it on several occasions. In the
reliance article Fuller assumes almost throughout that the discussion
concernspromises: the article chiefly addresses the question when and
to what extent will promises be enforced because they have been or are
likely to be relied on. It is true that he devotes a few pages65 to liability
for misrepresentation in order to demonstrate that here, too, a distinc-
tion can be drawn between the reliance interest and the expectation
interest; and he also discusses other contractual problems- from the
same point of view, such as the effect of revocation of an offer. But
Fuller does not seem to appreciate the potential implications of the reli-
ance idea in these extensions of promissory liability. Nowhere-does he
fully explore the question whether reliance on non-promissory lan-
guage or conduct may not, of itself, be a ground for the imposition of
liability, in which case the protection of reliance may be a principle of
far wider importance than contract.
This omission is all the more curious in light of Fuller's reference
to the cases in which reliance has been allowed to override the auton-
omy principle, that is, where there is, "a promise which the promisor
expressly stipulate[s] should impose no legal liability on him."66 But
what kind of a promise is this? A strict positivist might insist that a
person could morally bind himself by a non-legally binding promise;
but it is an uphill task to argue that a person who disclaims all legal
responsibility for reliance on his language is nevertheless making a
morally binding commitment. And for Fuller, of all people, to say or
imply that this could be the case is doubly puzzling. For Fuller would
surely have said that a person who disclaims responsibility for reliance
on his words quite clearly negatives the very moral responsibility which
normally justifies the imposition of legal liability. Of course, so long as
Fuller thought of reliance almost exclusively in conjunction with
promises, it was more understandable that he continued to assume the
primacy of the principle of private autonomy. A promise, after all, can
be seen as, and indeed often is expressly couched in the form of, an
invitation to rely. Hence the question whether the promisee was justi-
65. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 1, at 406-10.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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fled in relying as he did is often not even perceived-and does not seem
to have been perceived by Fuller-as raising serious problems so long
as reliance is tied to explicit promises. But even this oversight raises
some fundamental questions. In particular, by permitting unbargained-
for reliance to justify enforcement of a promise, the law necessarily em-
barks on a substantial redistributive exercise. The promisee is granted
an entitlement to rely which he has not bought.
I will return to this point later.67 Here I must pass to what is per-
haps an even more serious implication of reliance theory once reliance
becomes detached from promissory obligation. Once liability is im-
posed-for example, in tort, or via estoppel-for loss caused by justifi-
able reliance on language or conduct which cannot in any sense be
regarded as promissory, the whole issue ofjust/ability of the reliance is
opened up to a collective judgment. It cannot be asserted with even a
modicum of plausibility that this kind of reliance--that is, reliance on
non-promissory language or conduct-can be treated as giving rise to
enforceable legal rights in some "neutral" sort of way. There must be a
community or court judgment not merely as to the "reasonableness" of
the reliance, as it is often put, but as to thejustfabiliVy of reliance so as
to shift the risk of ill consequences away from the party relying. Once
reliance came to play the major role even in promissory cases which
was ascribed to it by Fuller, it was almost inevitable that its role would
expand into these.areas of non-promissory language and conduct. Yet
Fuller never seems to have shown awareness of what this might
involve.
Fuller's failure to address the issues raised by reliance on non-
promissory language or conduct is also surprising because he lays so
much stress on tacit promises and on custom as a source of reciprocal
expectations. Although it may remain possible to treat the protection
of reliance on an express promise as a form of promissory liability, it
becomes implausible if not impossible so to treat reliance on an implied
or tacit promise. Of course we infer promises for a variety of different
reasons, but Fuller never seems to have appreciated that one powerful
motive that often impels the inference of a promise is simply the reli-
ance of one party on the other. Rather than deciding that there has
been justifiable reliance because of a tacit promise, we often infer a
promise because we believe there has been justifiable reliance. Perhaps
the reason why some of us may sympathize with Fuller's suggestion of
an implicit promise by the legislator to judge citizens in accordance
with his own laws is the fact that he has invited-indeed instructed-
67. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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.citizens to act in accordance with the laws. Having thus relied on the
laws, having thus changed their position in many ways, it would be a
monstrous injustice if the citizenry were then condemned for this very
process. So the legislator may indeed be under the obligation which
Fuller asserted, but it is not obvious that much is gained by classifying
this as a promissory obligation.
In other words, we often imply the promise because we think there
ought to be an obligation, not the other way round. Calling the obliga-
tion promissory then seems to legitimate the imposition of the obliga-
tion by invoking "neutral" moral principles, but in reality "we" feel-
or most of us do--that there should be an obligation in this situation
because of many of our basic presuppositions about liberalism, free-
dom, and the individual's role in society-presuppositions shared, of
course, by Fuller. Recognizing openly why we want to impose such
obligations is surely better than pretending that these are self-assumed
obligations like those usually thought to arise from explicit promises.
A similar analysis may be offered of the famous Wisconsin case,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,68 in which the court imposed a reliance
liability on the defendants for (in effect) bad faith negotiations as a
result of which the plaintiff had committed himself in various ways and
suffered loss when no contract was ever concluded. Many commenta-
tors, following a Fullerian approach, assume that this case involved en-
•forcement of an implied promise to bargain in good faith. Yet it is far
from evident where this implied promise came from: the defendants
could well have argued that they intended no such promise because the
normal understanding of negotiating parties is that each acts at his own
risk until a deal is concluded. It clearly follows from the court's deci-
sion that Red Owl owed a duty not to cause loss by failure to bargain in
good faith, but it is hardly plausible to say that this duty arose from
defendant's intentions or from the parties' private ordering. It arose
from the court's perception of the requirements of good faith, even if
this in turn was derived from normal understanding of commercial
behavior.
Fuller would, I think, have responded to this argument by saying
that implied contracts or implied terms are based on normal under-
standings and that they are parasitic on normal transactions between
people acting normally. Thus good faith in bargaining is the norm and
the "implication" of a duty to bargain in good faith is genuine.
Many lawyers would find this a defensible position, but there are
serious difficulties in reconciling it with other facets of Fuller's theories.
68. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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In particular, Fuller laid great stress on custom, practice, and reciprocal
standards of behavior as the substantive sources of obligation both in
the case of enacted law and in the case of contract. Indeed, in dealing
with enacted law he stresses the rationality and purposiveness of cus-
tomary behavior, and declares that "we cannot understand 'ordinary
law'--that is, officially declared or enacted law--unless we first obtain
an understanding of what is called customary law." 69
At this point 70 there appears to be a close connection between
Fullers perception of law in general and his perception of contract-
which, indeed, he often insisted was a sort of private law for the parties.
In both cases Fuller sees the informal normative rules of customary law
or personal interactions as the primary source of the eventual obliga-
tions, perhaps as paradigmatic of public and private law respectively.
In both cases the formal source, -"law" or "contract," is then superim-
posed on the informal norms. Legislation thus becomes "formal" law,
a formal, official declaration of what is right; equally, contract itself
then becomes a sort of "form," a formal, authoritative determination of
how the parties admit they ought to behave. In this connection it is
important to note that Fuller's perception of customary law was far
wider than, say, Llewellyn's perception of mercantile usage. Indeed, to
Fuller, customary law seems to have been almost equivalent to what
might be called social morality. Although Fuller never quite spells out
this perception of the relation of express contract to implied contract or
of the similarity between express contract and enacted or "made" law,
he gets within a whisker of doing so in Consideration and Form when
he discusses the role of moral obligation in the doctrine of considera-
tion.7 ' Far from being aberrant departures from principle, the cases
upholding moral obligation as a consideration are, Fuller says, capable
of rational defense:
When we say the defendant was morally obligated to do the thing
promised, we in effect assert the existence of a substantive ground for
enforcing the promise. In a broad sense, a similar line of reasoning
justifies the special status accorded by law to contracts of exchange.
Men ought to exchange goods and services; therefore when they enter
contracts to that end, we enforce those contracts.... The court's
conviction that the promisor ought to do the thing, plus the prom-
isors own admission of his obligation, may tilt the scales in favor of
enforcement where neither standing alone would be sufficient.72
69. See L. FULLR, supra note 4, at 213.
70. See id, especially at 236.
71. Fuller, supra note 22, at 821-22.
72. Id at 821.
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This comes very close to saying that all contractual obligations are
ultimately referable to prior substantive grounds of duty, and that the
contract itself is merely a formal acknowledgment or admission of that
fact.7 3 On this view, neither enacted law nor explicit contract is a para-
digmatic source of law or 'legal obligation. They are only formal
sources. The primary or substantive sources must be sought behind the
formal sources. Of course, these substantive sources may lack qualities
such as clarity and precision, which renders it inappropriate to give
them legal validity without the addition of the subsequent formal pro-
cess-in this case; express contract. But the whole thrust of Fuller's
philosophy of law was to minimize the importance of the formal rules
of legal validity; therefore, he probably would have played down the
idea that the prior sources of obligation are in some sense less "impor-
tant" than the subsequent formal ones.
Fuller's discussions of the source of obligation for custom itself
provides further confirmation of this. Why is customary law binding,
whence the legitimacy of requiring parties to behave in accordance
with custom? Fuller rejects the idea that this legitimacy can be based
on a sense of obligation, or on a belief that the custom is binding---the
opinio necessitatis. In clear cases, this is merely a tautology; where new
customs are emerging, this doctrine gives no answer.
Fuller turns for his solution to the promissory estoppel idea in sec-
tion 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts.
As formulated to fit the problem at hand this principle would run
along these (unfortunately somewhat complex) lines: Where by his
actions toward B, A has (whatever his actual intentions may have
been) given B reasonably to understand that he (4) will in the future
in similar situations act in a similar manner, and B has, in some sub-
stantial way, prudently adjusted his affairs to the expectation thatA
will in the future act in accordance with this expectation then A is
bound to follow the pattern set by his past actions toward B. This
creates an obligation byA4 to B. If the pattern of interaction followed
byA4 and B then spreads through the relevant community, a rule of
general customary law will have been created. This rule will nor-
mally become part of a larger system, which will involve a complex
network of reciprocal expectations. Absorption of the new rule into
the larger system will, of course, be facilitated by the fact that the
interactions that gave rise to it took place within limits set by that
system and derived a part of their meaning for the parties from the
wider interactional context within which they occurred.74
73. This is the theory developed in P. ATIYmA, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW (1981) at chap-
ters 5-7.
74. L. FULLER, supra note 4, at 227.
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At this point Fuller is in danger of being caught up in a vicious
circle: express contract, like "made law," depends on, even arises out
of, what parties "ought to be doing anyhow"; what they "ought to be
doing" is complying with customary and traditional patterns of behav-
ior;, these are binding on them because they involve giving informal
understandings of how they will behave and inducing others to rely
"prudently" on those understandings. But why do these "informal un-
derstandings" create obligations? To escape a petio princ&pii here
Fuller must surely go in one of two directions: he must choose between
the principle of private autonomy or a collective determination of what
is a "prudent" or justifiable reliance on the language or behavior of
another.
I cannot find in Fuller's work a clear indication of which road he
would ultimately have chosen. Jn many places he apparently views
collective judgments as to what is "reasonable" or justifiable as para-
sitic on normal, intentional behavior. For example, parties who mis-
lead others as to their intentions are thus held liable on an "objective"
interpretation of their behavior, but this presupposes a world in which
people normally mean what they say.7" On this view, one could argue
that "implications" are parasitic on normal behavior, normal inten-
tions. But elsewhere in his writings Fuller seems to argue that normal
behavior and normal intentions often fail to answer the questions
which face us in the law. For example, in the reliance article Fuller
exposes the emptiness of the foreseeability rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale:76
[I]t is clear that the test of foreseeability is less a definite test itself
than a cover for a developing set of tests. As in the case of all "rea-
sonable man" standards, there is an element of circularity about the
test of foreseeability. "For what items of damage should the court
hold the defaulting promisor? Those which he should as a reason-
able man have foreseen. But what should he have foreseen as a rea-
sonable man? Those items of damage for which the court feels he
ought to pay."77
This element of circularity seems to me to extend to the whole
relationship between explicit contract and imposed legal obligations.
The meaning and nature of express promises take much of their sub-
stance from ideas of reasonableness but ideas of reasonableness derive
in .part from normal patterns of purposive behavior. There is, inevita-
bly, action and reaction here: but which is paramount? Which is the
75. A similar idea seems to underlie the argument offered in J. Raz, Promise.s i Morality and
Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 916 (1982) (book review).
76. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
77. Fuller and Perdue, sspra note 1, at 85.
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.paradigm and which is parasitic? The answer to this question will
often not matter; however, it may matter when principles of autonomy
and reasonable reliance conflict. It may also matter when the law
draws on residuary principles or ideals for extensions and new
developments.
It is comforting to rest on our familiar conceptions of freedom of
contract to answer this question, but Fuller, again in the reliance arti-
cle, shows how easy it is to reverse our notions of what is normal and
what exceptional, just as it is to reverse our perception of what is para-
digmatic and what parasitic. Thus in dealing with the distinction be-
tween business contracts, normally enforceable while still executory,
and non-business contracts, which tend to be enforceable only after re-
liance, Fuller points out how easy it would be to "base the whole law of
contracts on a fundamental premise that only those promises which
have been relied on will be enforced."78 All we need add is that "the
chief exception" to this principle will be the bilateral business
agreement.
I have elsewhere developed the argument that the past century or
thereabouts has seen a shift in the paradigm of contractual obligation. 79
In "the age of freedom of contract"-wherever that is placed--the
principle of private autonomy was supreme. "Reasonableness" took its
color from that principle; therefore, "objective" interpretations and
"justifiable" reliance were viewed as parasitic on the private autonomy
principle. In particular, reliance was largely seen as justifiable if, and
,only if, it was based on a promise. Today, with the waning of the pri-
vate autonomy principle, "reasonableness" appears to be a more basic
community judgment, drawing its sustenance less from private auton-
omy and more from collective moral ideas and even customary prac-
tices and redistributive ideologies. Private autonomy must now
accommodate itself to reasonableness, rather than the other way round.
The result is that the notion of justifiable reliance may be gradu-
ally acquiring dominance over the private autonomy principle. Not all
reliance on a promise is today seen as justifiable: for example, a prom-
ise by a consumer inserted in a contract in small print. Conversely,
reliance on language and conduct is more often seen as justifiable even
in the absence of a promise. Reliance has greatly developed as a source
of liability in warranty law, in misrepresentation law, in products "lia-
bility cases, in ordinary negligence actions, and of course in estoppel
and promissory estoppel. Some of these forms of liability could be de-
78. Id at 70.
79. See P. AriYAH, supra note 49, especially chapters 20-22.
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fended as liability on an "implied promise," but many of them cannot
be so explained without circularity or distortion. Many therefore illus-
trate the growing ascendancy of the reliance principle over the private
autonomy principle.
A recent English decision, Yianni v. Edwin Evans & Sons,80 illus-
trates this process. The plaintiffs wanted to buy a house and applied
for a loan to a "building society," a widely used type of home loan
mutual society. The building society, as customary, commissioned a
valuation which was conducted by the defendant surveyors. The report
being favorable, the building society loaned the plaintiffs eighty per-
cent of the amount of the valuation. The plaintiffs did not see the de-
fendants' valuation, which was shown only to the building society, but
they paid the defendants' fee through the building society. The valua-
tion turned out to be grossly excessive, the defendants having negli-
gently failed to discover structural weakness in the house which had to
be put right at a substantial cost. The plaintiffs recovered damages
against the defendants for their negligence: the court held that the
plaintiffs had reasonably and foreseeably relied on the valuation, even
though they had not seen it, because they assumed that the house was
worth at least the amount loaned to them.8' There was, of course, no
promise or warranty addressed by the defendants to the plaintiffs; in-
deed, the defendants clearly did not intend that their valuation should.
be made available to or be directly relied on by the plaintiffs because
they advised the plaintiffs to commission their own survey. Nor in all
probability did the defendants charge a fee commensurate with the as-
sumption of liability to the plaintiffs.82
It seems clear enough that if the principle of private autonomy was
paramount, the defendants should not have been liable: they did not
intend to assume liability nor even to invite reliance by the plaintiffs. It
is true, and was found as a fact, that the plaintiffs' reliance was in one
sense foreseeable and reasonable because most buyers do not commis-
sion their own surveys but rely on the building society's willingness to
lend as sufficient evidence of the value of the property. But although
this reliance may thus be said to have been "reasonable" it is hard to
see how the plaintiffs could have been entitled to throw on the defend-
ants the result of their reliance if traditional principles of contract had
prevailed. The plaintiffs had no "right" or "entitlement" to rely so as
to hold the defendants liable for the consequences. They had not
80. [19821 Q.B. 438.
81. Id at 457.
82. Before the decision in this case it had been widely assumed that surveyors were not liable
in these circumstances, so it is fair to assume they charged accordingly.
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"bought" such a right; although they had paid the defendants' fee, the
fee clearly did not include any element of "premium" to protect the
plaintiffs against the risk which occurred.
The decision in favor of the plaintiffs-and this is typical of many
such cases today, both in England and America-stems from the shift
from contractual and promissory doctrine to reliance or tort doctrine.
Contract doctrine, at least when it was largely bargain-based, only pro-
tected paid-for reliance. The promisee had to buy the right to rely.
Once the courts shift into reliance or tort doctrine however, they in
effect "give" the right to rely to the plaintiff and are thus engaged in a
redistributive exercise. Furthermore, they do so largely on the ground
that the plaintiffs have relied in fact, and in a normal, customary-
therefore foreseeable-manner. Factual, customary reliance becomes
justifiable reliance and is thus converted into a legally protected
reliance.
It is, of course, true that any decision awarding damages to an
injured plaintiff in a tort case involves a distributive element; even the
torts of battery or conversion of goods depend on recognition that the
person injured had the "entitlement" not to be injured by the battery or
the conversion, and in that sense involve recognition that, as between
the two parties, the entitlement is allocated to the victim. But in Yi-
anni, and in any case in which the plaintiff is claiming reliance losses,
there are two special features which make the distributive implications
particularly striking. First, in the typical tort case the plaintiff has suf-
fered a loss which is a social as well as a private cost, and traditionally
tort law has been seen as having at least some concern for the avoid-
ance or minimization of such social costs. But in the instant case, and
in most typical reliance cases, the plaintiff has incurred a private cost
which is not a social cost at all. The plaintiffs' loss in the instant case
was offset, from the social viewpoint, by the corresponding gain to the
seller of the property.. Hence, the argument is purely about the alloca-
tion of the loss between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the court
could only shift the loss to the defendants by allocating to the plaintiffs
a "right to rely" to which they were not prima facie entitled.
83
Of course, much the same may be said of plain theft where the
gain to the thief counterbalances the loss to the owner, and the tort
remedy can therefore only be granted by allocating the entitlement in
question to the owner. However, in this situation, the allocation of the
entitlement takes place in accordance with the preexisting set of prop-
83. On the distinction between private and social cost in cases of this kind, see Bishop, Eco-
nomic Loss in Tort, 2 OxFoRD J. LEo. STUDIES 1 (1982); Rizzo, The Economic Loss Probiern A
Comment on Bishop, id at 197; Bishop, Economic Loss. A Repl to Professor Rizzo, id at 207.
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erty laws, whereas in the case under discussion, the allocation of the
right-at any rate on the first occasion such a decision is mad4-in-
volves a change from the preexisting allocation of entitlements. More-
over, the change in allocation--the redistribution of rights-is
particularly striking because it concerns an entitlement to a recogniza-
ble commodity which can be bought in the market, and could have
been so bought by the present plaintiffs. They could have bought ad-
vice with "a right to rely" on that advice, but they did not do so.
A second striking feature of decisions of this character is that the
plaintiffs' loss or injury stems not only from the defendants' conduct or
language, but more immediately from the plaintiffs' own free choice
decision to act in reliance on that conduct. Because the defendants in-
tended that the plaintiffs should not be entitled to shift the risk of such
reliance to them and the plaintiffs likewise could not intelligibly have
intended that their action in reliance should be at the defendants' risk,
the allocation of the entitlement to rely to the plaintiffs clearly violated
the principle of private autonomy.85 This result seems to me to illus-
trate very well the curious way in which the development of reliance
doctrine-for which Fuller was substantially responsible--today
clashes so violently with the principle of private autonomy which he so
strongly favored.
Nevertheless, I would like to end by suggesting that there is a
broad sense in which the protection of "reasonable" reliance-perhaps
even in the extended way illustrated above--ought not to cause serious
anxiety to the modem liberal. F. A. Hayek has repeatedly warned us
that non-contractual expectations cannot be protected to the hilt with-
out serious infringements of the rights of others.86 . My "expectations"
in my job, my income, the retention of the present vallie of my property
and so forth depend entirely on the assumption that other people will
continue to behave in ways that I have no right to compel them to
behave. The continuation of my job in a market society depends on a
84. Of course, once the decision is accepted and becomes known, it can be assumed that
surveyors will begin charging an appropriate premium for the extra risk they are forced to bear.
Thus, the long-term result of such decisions is the familiar one of introducing--in effect-a system
of compulsory insurance; the allocative effect of giving the home buyer a "right to rely" will thus
remain, but future buyers will have to pay for the right.
85. It must be admitted that all these remarks may seem just as applicable to the case of'
fraud as they are to negligence; but a general allocation of an entitlement to rely on the honesty of
those with whom we deal is one thing, and a general allocation of the right to rely on the careful-
new of others is something else--especially when the risk covered is primarily a risk of financial
rather than physical loss.
86. In particular see F. HAYEK, The Mirage of Social Ju.rce, in 2 LAw, LEGISLATION AND
LmERTY at 114-25, 137-38, 140-41 (1976); see aso T. HONOan, QUEST FOR SECURITY: EMPLoY-
tns, TENANTS, WivEs (1982) (Hamlyn Lectures).
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.continuing demand for the services I can provide. If people's needs or
tastes change, I may lose my job; my property may depreciate in value
and so on. These results can only be avoided by freezing the existing
economic arrangements in society in a way which would greatly benefit
the haves at the expense of the have-nots. In any event, not all expecta-
tions can be fully protected because some people expect no relevant
change, while others expect change beneficial to them.
On the other hand, it is surely one of the marks of a liberal society
that revolutionary or even over-rapid change should be avoided where
possible. Protecting reliance is, in a broad sense, a way of reconciling
the need for change with the desire to avoid infliction of unnecessary
suffering on those who lose by change. Protection of all non-contrac-
tual .expectations would be not only inconsistent with all change, it
would be impossible for the reasons given above. But protection of at
ileast some kinds of non-contractual reliance is not inconsistent with
change. All it does is to cushion those liable to be most severely af-
fected by the change. The radical or revolutionary may protest that
this is merely a way of enabling "the rich" to hang on to part of their
wealth a little longer, but at the present day as much of the demand for
this form of protection--job protection, income maintenance and so
on--comes from "the poor" as from the rich. Perhaps Fuller, with his
sympathy for Burkean gradualism, as well as his faith in the rationality
and legitimacy of customary behavior, would ultimately have come to
see that his reliance principle could be justifiably extended to the non-
promissory arena, and that once entrenched there it might often take
priority even over the principle of private autonomy.

